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INTRODUCTION

Jude Law fashions a smirk.1 Maintaining a cool demeanor, he says,
“Mr. Smythe, . . . I’m from the Credit Union.”
Smythe stammer[s]. “Wait, I can pay.”
“Sorry,” [Jude says] “That’s not my department.” [Jude] raise[s]
the taser and [takes] steady aim. “I’m legally bound to ask you if
you’d like an ambulance on standby, though you will be unable
to secure another artiforg2 from the Credit Union in replacement.”
“Wait,” [Smythe says] again, “don’t—”
That’s as far as [Smythe] got before [Jude’s] taser darts slammed
into [Smythe’s] chest and released their electricity. He went down
twitching . . .3
The ever-handsome Jude Law ties a white apron around himself.4 He reaches
into his duffel bag and withdraws a scalpel.5 He pushes the sharp tip into
Smythe’s belly.6
Now, I am sure we can all use our imaginations to envision what happens
next. If not, go see Repo Men.7 Nonetheless, I will let a spoiler slip. Jude Law
proceeds to thrust his hand into Smythe’s open wound and dig out Smythe’s
artificial liver.8 Why? Because Smythe defaulted on his “artiforg” payment.9
When Repo Men was released in 2010, those of us who saw it probably thought
this type of scenario could never happen; in fact, the absurdity of the plot is likely
what attracted us to the theater in the first place. Although the idea of creating

1 See REPO MEN (Relativity Media 2010) (adapted from ERIC GARCIA, THE REPOSSESSION
MAMBO (2009)).
2 Slang for “artificial organ.”
3 ERIC GARCIA, supra note 1, at 5.
4 See REPO MEN, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. Repo Men is a 2010 American science fiction action film—starring Jude Law, Forest
Whitaker, and Liev Schreiber. See Plot Summary of Repo Men, IMDB, https://www.
imdb.com/title/tt1053424/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (“Set in the near future when artificial
organs can be bought on credit, [Repo Men] revolves around a man who struggles to make the
payments on a heart he has purchased.”).
8 Id.
9 Id.
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functioning artificial human organs is astonishing, it is frankly more frightening
to think that a third party could legally retrieve one of our body parts without
our consent. This fear is partly because artificial organs are not just outlandish
ideas from a work of science fiction—they are scientific reality.10 These artificial
organs are not made from huge chunks of metal, as in Repo Men, or from other
synthetic or nonliving materials.11 3D bioprinted organs actually comprise of living cells.12
I present this scene from Repo Men because it generates several important
questions. First, was Smythe’s organ really his? Well, it was his in the sense that
the artificial organ was inside of him and functioned as a natural liver would (at
least, we can hope it did). Yet, at the end of the day, we learn that Smythe did
not have complete control and dominion over his liver because the “Credit Union” claimed superior title. The issue of title and ownership seems problematic
in light of existing federal laws and regulatory schemes. Should 3D bioprinted
organs be regulated as natural organs or as medical devices? What happens if 3D
bioprinted organs are patentable? Is there ever a possibility that a recipient of a
3D bioprinted organ could face a Repo Men fate? In light of the growing reality
of 3D bioprinted organs, legal issues arising from these concerns can easily bleed
into our society. This bleeding therefore demands exploration.
The beginning of this Note dissects the scientific underpinnings of 3D bioprinted organs. Part II explores statutory authority and controlling, or otherwise
persuasive, case law that pertains to subject matter patentability. Current rights
associated with medical devices and one’s own natural organs are also identified.
Part III analyzes how 3D bioprinted organs should be regulated and how the
patentability of 3D bioprinted organs squares with potential regulatory frameworks. Ultimately, this Note reaches the conclusion that 3D bioprinted organs
are patentable subject matter and that, in general, 3D bioprinted organs should
be regulated as medical devices. In the patentability wrinkle, this Note also observes how the anti-commodification of patented 3D bioprinted organs would
be a legal contradiction under current federal law.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. WHAT ARE 3D BIOPRINTED ORGANS?

3D bioprinting is a “manufacturing technique used to fabricate artificial implants or complex tissue constructs through a layer-by-layer building process for

10 See sources cited and accompanying text infra note 29 (noting recent innovations in 3D
bioprinted organs).
11 See Haitao Cui et al., 3D Bioprinting for Organ Regeneration, 6 ADVANCED HEALTHCARE
MATERIALS 1, 2 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1002/adhm.201601118 (“3D bioprinting for organ
[]generation involves . . . printing multiple living cells.”).
12 Id.
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patient-specific therapy.”13 Unlike traditional 2D printing, 3D bioprinting is “a
comprehensive process requiring various design considerations, including imaging, modeling, printer choice, bioink selection, [cell] culture condition, and 3D
construct development.”14
There are two forms of 3D bioprinting that may be implemented to create a
3D bioprinted organ: cellular bioprinting and acellular bioprinting.15 Cellular bioprinting involves “directly deposit[ing] bioinks with viable cells to form a 3D
living structure.”16 Conversely, acellular bioprinting uses nonliving materials such
as “ceramics, metals, polymers and their composites” to form a 3D nonliving
structure.17 This 3D nonliving structure is then integrated with cells, outside of
the printing process, to form a 3D bioprinted organ.18 Acellular, compared to
cellular, 3D bioprinting “provides more extensive choices for material selection
and manufacturing method.”19 Nevertheless, both cellular and acellular printing
techniques may be employed to create a 3D bioprinted organ.20
B. THE PROMISE OF “ARTIFORGS”

Repo Men got one thing right: artificial organs would herald an era where recipients could extend or improve their quality of life.21 3D bioprinted organs can
potentially revolutionize the medical world by “offer[ing] a pathway for scalable
and reproducible mass production of engineered living organs” that “mimic their
natural counterparts.”22 Given the high demand for donor organs, the United
States’ organ transplant system is notorious for its lengthy waiting list and

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
15 See id. (explaining how 3D bioprinting can be “divided into [cellular and acellular techniques]” to produce artificial organs).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 12 (citing C. Y. Yap et al., Review of Selective Laser Melting: Materials and Applications, 2
APPLIED PHYSICS REVIEWS (2015), https://doi.org/10.1063/1.4935926).
18 See Chi-Chun Pan et al., Bioprinting for Tissue Engineering and Regenerative Medicine, MATERIAL
MATTERS 49, 49 (2016), https://www.sigmaaldrich.com/content/dam/sigma-aldrich/docs/
Aldrich/Brochure/1/material-matters-v11-n2.pdf (“Acellular bioprinting is used to manufacture the scaffold and biomaterial itself in the absence of cells during the printing process.”).
19 Cui, supra note 11, at 7.
20 Id. at 4.
21 See Xiaohong Wang, Bioartificial Organ Manufacturing Technologies, 28(1) CELL
TRANSPLANTATION 5 (2019), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6322143/
pdf/10.1177_0963689718809918.pdf (describing how 3D bioprinted organs “hold the promise to greatly improve the quality of health and average lifespan of human beings in the near
future”).
22 Cui, supra note 11, at 15 (referencing Y. S. Zhang et al., 3D Bioprinting for Tissue and Organ
Fabrication, 45 ANNALS OF BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING 148-63 (2016), https://link.springer.
com/article/10.1007%2Fs10439-016-1612-8.
13
14
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sluggish waiting time.23 As of July 2019, over 113,000 men, women, and children
were on the national transplant waiting list.24 This number grows each day, and
in fact, another person is added to the waiting list every 10 minutes.25 To make
matters worse, each day, 20 people die waiting for a transplant.26 These numbers
illustrate how 3D bioprinted organs may help to relieve the organ supply shortage by providing an additional supply source.27
While organ bioprinting has “shown great promise in current research,” the
challenge remains in formulating bioprinted organs that are suitable for implantation.28 So, while we are not quite in a Repo Men-type world just yet, an implantable 3D bioprinted human organ future is in sight.29 Conceivably, in just a few
years, “industrial, scalable, biofabrication of patient-specific functional 3D living
human organs suitable for clinical implantation” will occupy the marketplace.30

Health Resources & Services Administration, Organ Donation Statistics, ORGANDONOR.
22, 2019), https://www.organdonor.gov/statistics-stories/statistics.html.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Cui, supra note 11, at 2 (recognizing that 3D bioprinted organs “show great promise for
. . . ultimately mitigating organ shortage and saving lives”).
28 Id. at 15. See also Tim Lewis, Could 3D Printing Solve the Organ Transplant Shortage?,
GUARDIAN (Jul. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/30/will-3dprinting-solve-the-organ-transplant-shortage (explaining how the “one problem with creating
whole organs that has to be overcome” is “creating capillaries, which can be smaller in diameter than the smallest cell, has been nearly impossible”).
29 See Cui, supra note 11, at 26 (explaining how 3D bioprinted organs suitable for human
implantation has “remarkable potential” of being fully realized); see also Vanessa Listek, Organovo: Bioprinting Could Be the New Solution to Organ Transplantation, 3DPRINT.COM (May 6, 2019),
https://3dprint.com/243160/organovo-bioprinting-could-be-the-new-solution-to-organtransplantation/ (stating how Organovo, a San Diego-based tissue engineering company, is
set to test its 3D bioprinted liver “patches” in human trials in 2020); David Freeman, Israeli
Scientists Create World’s First 3D-Printed Heart Using Human Cells, NBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/israeli-scientists-create-world-s-first-3d-printedheart-using-ncna996031 (noting how Israeli researchers, in April 2019, were the first in the
world to 3D bioprint a heart made of human cells, albeit the size of a rabbit’s heart); Press
Release, Rice University, Organ Bioprinting Gets a Breath of Fresh Air (May 2, 2019),
https://news.rice.edu/2019/05/02/organ-bioprinting-gets-a-breath-of-fresh-air-2/
(announcing, in May 2019, how Rice University bioengineers were the first to ever develop bioprinting technology that “addresses the challenge of multivascularization in a direct and comprehensive way” and 3D-printed a “lung-mimicking structure”); Jesse Damiani, BIOLIFE4D
Just 3D Printed A Human ‘Mini-Heart’, FORBES (Sep. 9, 2019, 10:42am),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jessedamiani/2019/09/09/biolife4d-just-3d-printed-a-human-mini-heart/#26c60efd7eee (announcing how BIOLIFE4D, a Chicago biotech company
used 3D bioprinting to produce a miniature human heart that “features the same cellular structure as a full-sized human heart”).
30 Cui, supra note 11, at 15.
23

GOV (July
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C. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER

The intent behind limiting patentable subject matter is rooted in the underlying sentiment that patents are tools for promoting progress.31 In exchange for
disclosing useful, novel, and nonobvious inventions to the public, inventors’
“sweat of brow” is rewarded with patent protection of their invention.32 The
legal reward of a patent arms owners with “the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States.”33
1. Statutory Backbone
Title 35 of the United States Code is the backbone of the United States’ patent framework.34 Novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness are necessary predicates for patenting an invention.35 However, prior to pursuing the novelty, usefulness, and nonobviousness inquiries, one needs to ensure that the subject matter
of her invention is patentable.36 Section 101 dictates what is patentable and what
is not:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.37

31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
32 See J. Phillips, Patents and Incentives to Invent, 8 ENDEAVOUR 90 (1984),
https://doi.org/10.1016/0160-9327(84)90044-9 (explaining how a patent give its owners certain legal rights, “contingent upon . . . public disclosure”).
33 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018); see also Phillips, supra note 32, at 90 (stating that patents confer “a
legal right to prevent anyone else from making or using the invention which is its subject”).
34 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2018).
35 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (limiting grant of patents to inventions that are “new and useful”); see
also § 102 (stipulating the novelty condition for patentability); § 103 (stipulating the “nonobviousness” condition for patentability).
36 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89, 101 (1981) (emphasizing how novelty and
nonobviousness are “of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim
falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter”); see also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90, 132 (2012) (“[T]o shift the
patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to these later sections risks creating significantly greater legal
uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not equipped to
do.”).
37 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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In essence, § 101 effectively identifies four categories of patentable subject matter: (1) processes; (2) machines; (3) products of manufacture; and (4) compositions of matter.38
In 2011, § 101 underwent a significant transformation. The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA), enacted under President Obama, transformed the
patent system. Not only did the AIA replace the “first-to-invent” system with a
“first-to-file” system, the AIA also took statutory note in § 101 that human organisms are not patent-eligible subject matter:39 “[N]o patent may issue on a claim
directed to or encompassing a human organism.”40 Even though this § 101
amendment (albeit, in the form of a note) undoubtedly provided clarification to
the already broad language, Congress did not specify what exactly it meant by
“human organism.”41 Uncertainty lingers, especially when considering some
forms of biotechnology, like 3D bioprinted organs, teeter the fine line between
patentable and unpatentable subject matter.
2. Controlling and Relevant Case Law
Despite § 101’s relatively broad wording, the Supreme Court has recognized
non-statutory exceptions to subject matter eligibility.42 Natural laws, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are all subject matter that cannot be patented.43 Because 3D bioprinted organs’ usefulness comes from their potential to substitute
natural organs,44 3D bioprinted organs experience the most tension with the “law
of nature” exception.45

Id.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 101).
40 Id. § 33(a), 125 Stat. at 340.
41 See id. (lacking an unambiguous definition of “human organism”); see also Ava Caffarini,
Directed To or Encompassing a Human Organism: How Section 33 of the America Invents Act May
Threaten the Future of Biotechnology, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 768, 778 (2013) (explaining how the lack of a clear definition for the term “human organism” in section 33 of
AIA is practically problematic and ambiguous).
42 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (“This Court’s precedents provide three
specific exceptions to § 101’s broad principles: ‘laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
43 See id.
44 Wang, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that bioprinted organs seek to be “exclusive organ
substitutes for defective/failed human organs”).
45 See Jordana R. Goodman, Patenting Frankenstein’s Monster: Exploring the Patentability of Artificial Organ Systems and Methodologies, 15 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 65 (2017)(“If the
object of creating an artificial organ is to replicate one already found in nature, then, as science
gets closer and closer to the ultimate object, the products become less and less likely to be
patentable subject matter.”) (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303,
1351 (2012)).
38
39
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a. Application of the “Law of Nature” Exception
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Court considered
the law of nature exception as it applied to patent claims. The Court noted that
it had “‘long held that [Section 101] contains an important implicit exception[:]
Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.’”46 In
applying the law of nature exception, the Court in Myriad held that a genetic
sequence that was neither created nor altered was not patentable.47 While scientists from Myriad found “an important and useful gene,” the Court explained
that “separating [a] gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of
invention.”48
The Court distinguished its decision in Myriad from its earlier decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which held that scientists could patent a modified bacterium.49 In Chakrabarty, the Court ruled on the patentability of a genetically-modified organism.50 Scientists added plasmids to a bacterium which enabled the
bacterium to break down various components of crude oil.51 The Court justified
the patentability of the bacterium on the basis that it was modified.52 The modified bacteria “plainly qualifie[d] as patentable subject matter” because the modified bacteria was “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and]
use.’”53 Unlike the modified bacteria in Chakrabarty, the genetic sequence Myriad
researchers sought to patent “fell squarely within the law of nature exception.”54
Myriad “did not create anything.”55 Rather, Myriad merely isolated the genetic
sequence.56 But, the isolation of the genetic sequence did not change the fact that
the sequence was what Myriad claimed and that such sequence existed in nature

46 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012)).
47 See generally id.
48 Id. at 591.
49 See id. at 590-91 (explaining why the Court’s holding in Chakrabarty is distinguishable from
Myriad). Cf. id. at 591 (explaining how the Court’s reasoning in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), that a naturally-occurring nitrogen-fixing bacterium could not
be patented because the patent holder did not alter the bacteria in any way, is applicable to the
issue in Myriad).
50 See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
51 See id. at 305 (describing Chakrabarty’s invention as “a bacterium . . . containing . . . plasmids . . . capable of breaking down multiple components of crude oil”).
52 See id. (noting that the modified bacterium’s oil degradation property was “possessed by
no naturally occurring bacteria”); id. at 310 (“[P]atentee has produced a new bacterium with
markedly different characteristics from any found in nature . . . . His discovery is not nature’s
handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101.”).
53 Id. at 309-10 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)).
54 Myriad, 569 U.S. at 591.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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before Myriad found it.57 Myriad neither “create[d] or alter[ed] the genetic structure of DNA.”58 Neither were Myriad’s claims “expressed in terms of chemical
composition” or focused “in any way on . . . chemical changes that result[ed]
from the isolation.”59 Moreover, the Court found that the genes Myriad isolated
were not patentable subject matter.60 The Court further explained that these
genes were not like cDNA, which the Court believed could be patentable. 61 In
contrast to regular DNA, cDNA is not naturally occurring.62 Thus, a “lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.”63 Although
cDNA “retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, . . . it is distinct from the
DNA in which it comes from.”64 Therefore, cDNA is not subject to the “law of
nature” exception and “is patent eligible under [Section] 101.”65
Process claims, like product claims, are similarly restrained by the law of nature exception.66 While both Chakrabarty and Myriad resolved whether a product
was patentable subject matter, Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc. tackled whether a process that involved a law of nature was also patentable.67
The Court held that Prometheus’ claimed processes68 were not patentable because “simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas cannot make those
laws, phenomena, and ideas patentable.”69 The Court, however, recognized that
the mere recitation of a law of nature in a patent claim will not render the subject
matter unpatentable.70 As long as the claimed process that invokes a law of nature “has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself,” the
claimed process containing the law of nature could be patentable subject
57 See id. at 590 (“It is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter any of the genetic
information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. The location and order of the nucleotides existed in nature before Myriad found them.”).
58 Id. at 590.
59 Id. at 593.
60 See id. (holding that Myriad’s claims are “insufficient to satisfy the demands of § 101”).
61 See id. at 595 (stating that cDNA is patent-eligible subject matter).
62 See id. at 594 (“[C]reation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only
molecule that is not naturally occurring.”).
63 Id. at 595.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See generally 566 U.S. 66 (2012)(applying “law of nature” exception in finding a process
unpatentable).
67 See generally id.; Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (holding a claimed bacterium patentable); Myriad,
569 U.S. 576 (holding a genetic sequence unpatentable).
68 Prometheus’ patent claims “tell a treating doctor to measure metabolite levels and to
consider the resulting measurements in light of the statistical relationships they describe.”
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 86.
69 Id. at 66.
70 Id. at 77-78.
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matter.71 Thus, while the additional steps72 within Prometheus’s claims were not
themselves natural laws, “neither [were] they sufficient to transform the nature
of the claim.”73
In light of biotechnological advancements not anticipated by Section 101
drafters, courts have been tasked with contouring Section 101’s precise limitations.74 This is best and most recently demonstrated by the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals’ resolution of whether a cloned organism is patentable subject matter
in In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh).75 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held
that Dolly, the cloned sheep, was not patentable subject matter.76 Roslin conceded that the donor sheep’s genetic material used to conceive Dolly could not
be patented.77 However, Roslin argued that Dolly herself could be patented as
she was “the product of human ingenuity” and “not nature’s handiwork, but
[Roslin’s] own.”78 The court rationalized that “Dolly’s genetic identity to her donor parent,” claimed to be identical to a natural sheep’s, “render[ed] her unpatentable.”79 Given that animal clones do not possess “markedly different characteristics from any [animals] found in nature,” clones are not patentable subject
matter under § 101.80 Thus, Dolly the Sheep could not be patented.81 In response
to critique that the court skimmed over the nuances of biology in reaching its

71 Id. at 77. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (“Even though a phenomenon of
nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle
may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent
unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.”); see also Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that the claimed process was patentable subject matter because
the additional steps “implement[] or appl[y] that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect”). Cf. Parker, 437 U.S. at 594 (“Respondent’s process is unpatentable under § 101, not
because it contains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no
patentable invention.”).
72 Additional steps of Prometheus claims included an “administering” step, a “determining”
step, and a “wherein” step. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78.
73 Id.
74 See generally, e.g., In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (determining whether a sheep clone was patentable subject matter under § 101).
75 Id.
76 Id. Note, Roslin was already assigned a patent for the cloning process, which was not at
issue. Id. at 1334.
77 See id. at 1337 (“Roslin does not dispute that the donor sheep whose genetic material was
used to create Dolly could not be patented . . .”); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 593 (2013) (finding a naturally-existing gene unpatentable
under § 101).
78 Roslin, 750 F.3d at 1337.
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310).
81 Id.
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decision,82 the court (in dicta) conveyed that where claims explicitly identified
such “markedly different” biological nuances, a cloned organism may be patentable under § 101:83
There is nothing in the claims, or even in the specification, that
suggests that the clones are distinct in any relevant way from the
donor animals of which they are copies. The clones are defined
in terms of the identity of their nuclear DNA to that of the donor
mammals. To be clear, having the same nuclear DNA as the donor mammal may not necessarily result in patent ineligibility in
every case. Here, however, the claims do not describe clones that
have markedly different characteristics from the donor animals
of which they are copies.84
Given this emphasis on claim construction, it could be said that the court in
Roslin did not turn a blind-eye to science.85 Arguably, Roslin affects claim construction more so than the patentable science.86
D. CURRENT REGULATION OF HUMAN ORGANS

1. The Right to (Not) Sell Your Organs
Section 274e of the Public Health Service Act, otherwise referred to as the
National Organ Transplant Act or “NOTA,”87 makes it illegal for “any person
to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”88 The prohibition on the sale or purchase of human organs
does not apply to human organ paired donations.89 Congress’ intent behind
NOTA was “[t]o provide for the establishment of the Task Force on Organ
Transplantation and the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, to
authorize financial assistance for organ procurement organizations, and for other

82 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Dolly the Cloned Sheep Not Patentable in the U.S., IPWATCHDOG (May
8, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/05/08/dolly-the-cloned-sheep-not-patentable-in-the-u-s/id=49471/.
83 See Roslin, 750 F.3d at 1339 (emphasizing claim construction contributed to the court’s
“unpatentable” holding).
84 Id.
85 See id. (reasoning that clever claim construction may be used to patent an organism with
identical nuclear DNA).
86 See id.
87 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (“NOTA”), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339
(codified as amended §§ 42 U.S.C. 273-74 (1984)).
88 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(a) (West 2019).
89 See id. (“The [prohibition] does not apply with respect to human organ paired donation”);
see also § 274e(c)(4)(defining “human organ paired donation”).
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purposes.”90 The prohibition itself was meant to ban the commodification of
human organs.91 Congress’ desire to anti-commodify human organs was primarily influenced by three factors: “the religious belief that one’s soul is inextricably
tied to their body, the lack of an altruistic system raises concerns about the quality
of the organ supply, and because the free-market sale of organs will entrench
social inequality by benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the poor.”92
Importantly, NOTA goes on to define a “human organ” as:
the human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas,
bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof
and any other human organ (or any subpart thereof, including
that derived from a fetus) specified by the Secretary of Health
and Human Services by regulation.93
It is interesting to note, however, that the definition of “human organ” did not
originally explicitly encompass fetal organs. In 1988, Congress amended the definition of “human organ” to include fetal organs (and organ tissue parts). Congressional desire to broaden such definition arose from:
the fear of incentivizing abortions; (2) a lack of consent (it is immoral to allow a mother to consent to abortion on behalf of the
fetus and the fetus obviously is unable to give consent to be
aborted); (3) the conflation of the fetus as both the donor and
the donation; and (4) the commercialization of fetal tissue.94
The Secretary of Health and Human Services further expands NOTA’s “human organ” definition via its regulatory power by including “any vascularized
composite allograft.”95 A “vascularized composite allograft” is defined as a body
part with the following characteristics:

National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339. See
also Robert Jacobson, 3-D Bioprinting: Not Allowed or NOTA Allowed?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1117, 1122 (2016) (explaining how a principle purpose behind NOTA was to promote “equitable access” and “effective use” of organs (citing to S.REP. NO. 98-382, at 15 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981)).
91 See Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1122 (identifying the Senate’s view that “human body parts
should not be viewed as commodities.”) (citing S.REP. NO. 98-382, at 15 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3981).
92 Id.
93 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e(c)(1) (West 2019).
94 Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1132.
95 42 C.F.R. § 121.13 (2019)(emphasis added).
90
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(1) . . . vascularized and requires blood flow by surgical connection of blood vessels to function after transplantation;
(2) Containing multiple tissue types;
(3) Recovered from a human donor as an anatomical/structural
unit;
(4) Transplanted into a human recipient as an anatomical/structural unit;
(5) Minimally manipulated (i.e., processing that does not alter the
original relevant characteristics of the organ relating to the organ’s utility for reconstruction, repair, or replacement);
(6) For homologous use (the replacement or supplementation of
a recipient’s organ with an organ that performs the same basic
function or functions in the recipient as in the donor);
(7) Not combined with another article such as a device;
(8) Susceptible to ischemia and, therefore, only stored temporarily and not cryopreserved; and
(9) Susceptible to allograft rejection, generally requiring immunosuppression that may increase infectious disease risk to the recipient.96
Noticeably, the nine-part definition of a “vascularized allograft composite” is
conjunctive, rather than disjunctive.97 The conjunctive, rather than disjunctive,
nature of the definition significantly affects NOTA’s prohibition on organ sales
and purchases in practice.98 The Secretary’s inclusion of “vascularized allograft
composite” indeed broadens NOTA’s prohibitory umbrella over the sale and
purchase of human organs. But, the conjunctive, relative to the disjunctive, nature of the definition broadens the definition to a lesser an extent. To qualify as
42 C.F.R. § 121.2 (2019).
The “and” in “not cryptopreserved; and . . . [s]uscpetible to,” 42 C.F.R. § 121.2., makes
the definition of “vascularized allograft composite” conjunctive. See A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 1, 4 (2017),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/A-Guide-to-Reading-Interpreting-and-Applying-Statutes-1.pdf (“‘And’ typically signifies a conjunctive list, meaning
each condition in the list must be satisfied, while ‘or’ typically signifies a disjunctive list, meaning satisfying any one condition in the list is sufficient.”).
98 See A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes, supra note 97, at 4.
96
97

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol27/iss2/8

14

Whitacre: Don't Go Breakin' My (3D Bioprinted) Heart: Dissecting Patentabil

2020]

PATENTABILITY OF 3D BIOPRINTED ORGANS

371

a “vascularized allograft composite,” all nine parts must be met, rather than just
one of the nine.99 Thus, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
effectively expanded the regulatory reach of NOTA’s prohibition on organ
sales/purchases by broadening the scope of what constitutes a “human organ”
under the law.100 Congress’ expansion of the definition, however, is not as drastic
in application as one may think.101
E. CURRENT REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES

Most, if not all, ownership and possessory rights with respect to medical device implants are ascertained through contract law.102 As a result, property rights
can vary widely between of medical device recipients based on the flexibility and
fluidity of the contractual processes that are available to them.103 Recipients theoretically bear the right to freely negotiate contractual terms with the opposing
party (most of the time, a hospital/physician)104 and consent before being bound
to such terms.105 While knowledge of this variance is important, this Note will
only focus on ownership rights inherent to medical device recipients, contract
law principles aside.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) regulates medical devices to ensure their safety and effectiveness.106 This regulation extends from
pre-market devices to implanted devices.107 FDCA recognizes that a recipient of

See 42 C.F.R. § 121.2.
See, e.g., Mariam Aslam et al., Challenges and Best Practices for Health Systems to Consider When
Implementing Risk-Share Contracts for Medical Devices, MASSACHUSETTS MEDICAL SOCIETY (May 8,
2019), https://catalyst.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/CAT.19.0665 (highlighting the widespread
contractual practices amongst device distributors, hospitals, and device recipients).
101 At least not as significant as if a disjunctive “vascularized allograft composite” definition
was adopted. See A Guide to Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes, supra note 97.
102 See Aslam, supra note 100.
103 See Aditi Bagchi, Parallel Contract, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 145 (2013) (“In the classical
account of contract, parties . . . negotiate their agreements. Those agreements impose a specified set of performance obligations on each party, and the obligations of each are carefully tailored such that the bargain could not be improved to their mutual satisfaction.”).
104 While, in theory, recipients (technically “pre-recipients” as prior to actual receipt of the
medical device) have the right to freely negotiate, this right is often diluted by the inherently
unequal share of power in the patient-physician/hospital relationship and a possible discrepancy in bargaining power. EC Hui, Doctors as Fiduciaries: A Legal Construct of the Patient-Physician
Relationship, 11 HONG KONG MED. J. 527, 527 (2005)(“The acquisition of powers by one party
implies an inequality of influence, knowledge, and bargaining ability in [a fiduciary relationship], and this provides the fiduciary ‘a special opportunity to exercise the power or discretion
to the detriment of that other person. . .’” (quoting Hosp. Prods. Ltd v U.S. Surgical Corp.
(1984) 156 CLR 42 (Austl.) ).
105 See Bagchi, supra note 103, at 140.
106 Medical Device Regulation Act (Medical Device Amendments of 1976), Pub. L. No. 94295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. ch. 9, subch. V (2018)).
107 Id.
99

100
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a medical device has an important ownership interest that must be protected. 108
However, the FDCA acknowledges that the recipient’s right is not the only ownership interest in the medical device.109 The device vendor, the hospital/physician that implanted the device, and the patent owner (if there is one) also possess
ownership interests in the medical device.110
Under Medicare, an explanted medical device (i.e. an implanted device that is
later removed) “must be pursued by the provider as for free replacement or reduced charges under warranty.”111 This provision captures the desire to hold
vendors accountable for any faulty medical device implants that could jeopardize
recipients’ personal health.112 Fairness dictates that the vendor should bear the
cost of these defects, not the recipient.113 Tort law, namely product liability, reinforces this rationale.114
1. ‘Til Death Do Us Part?
Whether, in the event of death, medical implants are removed or left intact
largely depends on how the body is disposed of at death.115 In the case of burial,
the general consensus is that there is no compelling reason to remove implants.116
If the body is cremated, however, electronic and battery-containing medical implants, like pacemakers and ICDS, are “almost always” removed before

Id.
See id.
110 See id.; see also sources cited infra note 111.
111 Kayla Bryant, Hospital Compliance Programs Need to Integrate Explanted Device Policy, WOLTERS
KLUWER (Jul. 14, 2017),
http://health.wolterskluwerlb.com/2017/07/hospital-compliance-programs-need-to-integrate-explanted-device-policy/; see also Brenda Mickow et al., Medical Device Replacements,
MAYO CLINIC (2016), https://assets.hcca-info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/Conference_Handouts/Compliance_Institute/2018/W13_2.pdf (“All eligible explanted medical devices must be pursued for warranty credit and no-charge replacement. If the discounted replacement device cost is lower than half of the cost of the device, it must be reported on the
claim.” (citing 42 C.F.R. § 412.89 and § 419.45)).
112 See 21 U.S.C. ch. 9, subch. V; Richard Kaye, Federal Preemption of State Common-Law Products
Liability Claims Pertaining to Medical Devices, Implants, and Other Health-Related Items, 74 A.L.R. Fed
2d § 1, §§ 1-2 (2013).
113 Kaye, supra note 112, at §§ 1-2.
114 Id.
115 Frank Swain, What Happens to Prosthetics and Implants After You Die?, BBC (Mar. 10, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20140311-body-parts-that-live-after-death.
116 See id. (“Inert devices such as breast implants and replacement hips tend not to be removed after death, largely because there’s no compelling reason to do so, and they pose little
threat to the environment.”).
108
109
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cremation.117 Otherwise, the devices would inevitably explode during the
creamation process.118
“Once removed, implants are typically discarded – both the European Union
and the [United States], among others, have rules that forbid the reuse of implanted medical devices.”119 The ban on reuse, however, does not equate to a ban
on resale. A decedent recipient’s estate may elect to keep the recipient’s implant
and even choose to sell it (or a form of it) in the marketplace.120 For example, a
purchaser may be a collector of used devices or may be interested in scrapping
the device’s parts for money.121 Nevertheless, this right to sell a patented implant,
despite the ban on reuse, arises from the exhaustion doctrine.122
2. The Exhaustion Doctrine
The exhaustion doctrine, otherwise known as the first sale doctrine, is a “judicially created and judicially shaped doctrine” in patent law.123 “A key to the
exhaustion concept in the most common circumstances is that the patent owner
has sold a product without restriction. The sale seems to bring along a promise
that the patentee will not interfere with the customer’s full enjoyment of that
product.”124
Absent contractual restrictions to control downstream use and re-sale of
goods, “‘[w]hen a patentee chooses to sell an item, that product is no longer
within the limits of the monopoly’ and ‘instead becomes the private, individual
property of the purchaser, with the rights and benefits that come along with
ownership.’”125 These doctrinal underpinnings establish the default rights purchasers of medical implants possess.126 In this vein, purchasers of medical
Id.
Id. (explaining that “because . . . batteries [and other electronics] can explode when
heated” such devices are “often taken out of the body after death – and almost always before
cremation”).
119 Id.; see also Draft Guidance from the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, FDA,
on Reprocessing and Reuse
of Single-Use Devices (Feb. 8, 2000), https://www.fda.gov/media/71761/download (explaining that “if the device is an implant, . . . the [single-use device] is categorized as high risk”
and the single-use implant cannot be reprocessed or reused).
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Clark Boyd, Following Cremation, Recycling Surgical Implants, PRI, (Jan. 30, 2012),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-01-30/following-cremation-recycling-surgical-implants
((discussing a company that purchases old metal medical devices to smelt and sell).
122 LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES
& MATERIALS 701 (5th ed. 2017) (“[U]nlike copyright law, the patent exhaustion doctrine is
not codified in the statute.”)
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. (quoting Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1531 (2017)).
126 Id.
117
118
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implants are able to use, sell, or import the implant as they wish, as long as such
conduct does not transgress other legal constraints.127 Recall, however, that the
existing ban on reusing medical implants also restricts the market for used (explanted) medical devices.128 Additionally, hospital regulations or other health regulations, may preempt—or, in the least, limit—an individual’s ability to keep their
explanted device.129 Nonetheless, a slim market does not mean that recipients
(or their estate) cannot and will not resell the device.130 For example, a profit can
be made by salvaging the metal from metal medical devices (like hip and knee
implants) and selling that metal on the open market.131
The exhaustion doctrine allows purchasers and subsequent owners of explanted, patented medical devices to enjoy relatively unrestricted ownership
rights over such devices once these devices are released to them.132 The exhaustion doctrine, however, does not apply to the sale of human organs.133 Human
organs cannot be patented, so patent law and the judicially-created exhaustion
doctrine under patent law is not implicated. In addition, NOTA prohibits the
sale of human organs.134

See id. at 702 (“[T]he sale [of a patented object] transfers the right to use, sell, or import
because those are the rights that come along with ownership, and the buyer is free and clear
of an infringement lawsuit because there is no exclusionary right left to enforce.”) (quoting
Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017)); see generally Lexmark (overturning the Federal Circuit’s rejection of an exhaustion defense where the patentee had sold its products—toner cartridges for
laser printers—with an explicit “single use, no resale” limitation).
128 See Alec Klein, Used Medical Devices Being Sold on Ebay, Washington Post (Dec. 22, 2005),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2005/12/22/used-medical-devices-being-sold-on-ebay/ded0a712-f4c4-4d81-ba0c-acdf37658303/(recognizing that a market, albeit
marginal, exists for used medical implants).
129 See U-M Hospitals and Health Centers Policies and Procedures, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
HOSPITALS AND HEALTH CENTERS (2003), http://s3.amazonaws.com/rdcms-aami/files/production/public/FileDownloads/HTM/Idea_Exchange/EI_explants_UM.pdf(describing
University of Michigan’s hospital and health center’s “explant policy” that explants are not to
be returned to patients unless properly sterilized); see also ECRI Institute, Ask HRC: Retaining
Explanted Medical Devices, HEALTHCARE RISK, QUALITY, & SAFETY GUIDANCE (2016),
https://www.ecri.org/components/HRC/Pages/AskHRC122716.aspx (explaining how hospitals have a responsibility to manage certain risk when releasing explanted devices to patients);
Nancy Chobin, Advice on Explanted Devices, INFECTION CONTROL TODAY (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/sterile-processing/advice-explanted-implants
(“While we would like to accommodate the patient’s request, we must always comply with the
standards and manufacturer’s instructions.”).
130 See, e.g., Clark Boyd, supra note 121 (discussing a company that purchases old metal medical devices to smelt and sell).
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See LOREN & MILLER, supra note 122, at 701.
134 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339
(codified as amended §§ 42 U.S.C. 273-74 (1984)).
127
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3. The Case of the Infringing Medical Implant
Another dilemma worth noting that invokes several ownership interests is
the situation in which a recipient’s implanted medical device may be subject to a
patent infringement suit.135 An individual is liable for patent infringement if he
“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention
during the term of the patent.”136 If the manufacturer of a recipient’s medical
implant is found liable for patent infringement, the manufacturer is most often
required to pay damages to the plaintiff, the rightful patent owner.137 Under current law, the individual is thankfully left alone and will not face Smythe’s fate in
Repo Men.138
III.

ANALYSIS

A. PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY

The general consensus amongst legal scholars and scientists alike is that bioprinted organs are patentable subject matter, so long as the 3D bioprinted organ
sought to be patented is properly claimed.139 As patent applicants have learned
from Dolly, claim construction largely dictates whether bioprinted organs can be
patented.140 Although these bioprinted organs are made from human cells, as
long as an applicant can claim a “markedly different characteristic” in 3D bioprinted organs, then there is no reason such bioprinted organ claim will not
pass the USPTO’s patentability muster.141 However, as scientists grow closer to
producing a 3D bioprinted organ that is functionally fungible with a natural human organ, patentability grows more difficult.142 This is because the closer
135 See generally, e.g., Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (patent infringement suit involving a component of a prosthetic hip implant).
136 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2018).
137 See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 517, 53642 (noting the commonality of damages as the form of relief in medical implant patent infringement cases).
138 See id.
139 See generally Tabrez Ebrahim, 3D Bioprinting Patentable Subject Matter Boundaries, 41 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1 (2017)(exploring how bioprinted organs, as long as properly claimed, can be patentable subject matter); Judith L. Toffenetti & Atabak R. Royaee, Patentability of 3D-Printed
Organs, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (May 15, 2014),
https://www.genengnews.com/insights/patentability-of-3d-printed-organs/77900129/ (advocating that bioprinted organs are patentable subject matter).
140 See In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (indicating
that a genetically equivalent or similar entity may be found patentable under § 101 depending
on claim construction).
141 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (holding a bacterium’s “markedly different characteristics” rendered it patentable subject matter).
142 See Jordana R. Goodman, Patenting Frankenstein’s Monster: Exploring the Patentability of Artificial Organ Systems and Methodologies, 15 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 63 (2017) (“The
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scientists get, the closer scientists are to effectively replicating nature.143 With this
goal, scientists seeking to patent such bioprinted organs tip-toe § 101’s implicit
law of nature exception.144
In spite of bioprinted organs “tip-toeing” the law of nature exception, recent
innovations demonstrate that 3D bioprinted organs nonetheless possess markedly different characteristics from natural organs that would render them patentworthy.145 While a bioprinted organ may consist of human cells, which themselves are naturally occurring, this does not mandate the finding that a bioprinted
organ is naturally occurring and, therefore, not patentable under § 101. Not only
is a bioprinted organ significantly distinct from a natural organ, but it is also a
product of human ingenuity. These two showings demonstrate that, under the
Chakrabarty/Myriad framework, a 3D bioprinted organ is patentable subject matter.
A 3D bioprinted organ suitable for human implantation will ideally be functionally equivalent to a natural organ.146 However, functional equivalence does
not preclude patent subject matter eligibility as long as the 3D bioprinted organ
possesses a markedly different characteristic from its natural counterpart. 147
Structurally, a 3D bioprinted organ may be markedly different from its natural
counterpart.148 Whereas a clone, like Dolly the Sheep, is necessarily genetically
identical to its natural parent, a 3D bioprinted organ is not necessarily genetically
identical to its natural analogue. Specifically, 3D bioprinted organs are typically
built by scaffolding live stem cells on other biomaterials, like polymers, that are
not present in a natural human organ heart.149 Moreover, Roslin cannot be used
to intuit that 3D bioprinted organs are unpatentable subject matter. A 3D bioprinted organ is distinguishable from a cloned organism.
In terms of human ingenuity, “stem cells cannot self-assemble into a uniform
structure in vitro, let alone function as an organ.”150 The creation of a 3D
closer scientists get to replication of a natural product, the further scientists get to patent protection of their invention.”).
143 See id. (“The problem lies in this progression: scientists are working to replicate a natural
product.”); see also background discussion supra Part II.B (explaining the origins of and practical
effect of the law of nature exception).
144 See sources cited supra note 143.
145 See sources cited supra note 29.
146 See generally Wang, supra note 21.
147 See Roslin, 750 F.3d at 1339 (holding that genetic similarity does not necessarily preclude
patentability under § 101).
148 Id.
149 See Wang, supra note 21, at 5 (describing how bioprinted organs built with human cells
typically also consist of inanimate polymers, or other biological polymers, not inherent to a
natural human organ).
150 Judith L. Toffenetti & Atabak R. Royaee, Patentability of 3D-Printed Organs, GENETIC
ENGINEERING AND BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (GEN)(May 15, 2014), https://www.genengnews.com/insights/patentability-of-3d-printed-organs/. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980) (holding a genetically-modified bacterium patentable because it was a
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bioprinted organ requires human manipulation.151 Natural forces, in isolation,
are incapable of generating a 3D bioprinted organ.152 A 3D bioprinted organ
does not form in a mother’s womb upon conception.153 A 3D bioprinted organ
is created by a scientist after numerous hours spent in the lab tinkering with cells,
bio-solutions, and a 3D printer to create something unnatural.154 Thus, a 3D
bioprinted organ is a product of human ingenuity.155
Even if the organ itself cannot be patented as a product of manufacture, the
process of synthesizing the organ–as long as drafted with proper specificity—
may be eligible for a method patent.156 In fact, this has already been done for a
3D bioprinted tissue.157 There is no reason–holding all other variables constantthat a method for a bioprinted organ, which is a collection of tissues,158 cannot be
patented.
B. REGULATION OF PATENTED 3D BIOPRINTED ORGANS AS MEDICAL
DEVICES

Assuming the patentability of 3D bioprinted organs, a patented 3D bioprinted organ would not qualify as a “human organism” because it is not subject
to § 101’s law of nature exception.159 Moreover, a patented 3D bioprinted organ
presents a sticky situation in terms of ownership rights. Human organs cannot
be sold or purchased under NOTA.160 Since a patented 3D bioprinted organ is
“product of human ingenuity” and possessed “markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature”); Cf. Myriad, 569 U.S. at 590 (holding that the BRCA gene was not patentable
subject matter because the genetic sequence was naturally occurring and Myriad neither “create[d] or alter[ed] the genetic structure of DNA”).
151 See Wang, supra note 21, at 5 (describing the creation of 3D bioprinted organs as a “manufacturing process” by scientists).
152 In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
153 See id. (emphasizing that 3D bioprinted organs are artificial and intended to serve as substitutes to natural organs).
154 See Wang supra note 21.
155 See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (holding an altered bacterium to be patentable on
the basis of human ingenuity).
156 See U.S. Patent No. 10390946 (granted Aug. 27, 2019) (claiming “[a] method of preparing
biological tissue for use as a component of . . . a heart valve prosthesis” that contains biological
tissue).
157 See U.S. Patent No. 20190093070 (granted Mar. 28, 2019) (claiming “[a] method of producing a three-dimensional tissue having a vascular system structure” where “the cell used for
forming the three-dimensional tissue” includes-but is not limited to-”one derived from . . . a
human”).
158 Organ, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/organ(last visited Nov. 19, 2019, 9:17 PM).
159 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (case law explaining that for subject matter to
be patentable the law of nature exception cannot apply).
160 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA), Pub. L. No. 98-507., 98 Stat. 2339
(codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (1984)).
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neither a human organism nor a naturally-occurring composition of matter, a
patented bioprinted organ is also not a natural human organ. In this vein, a patented 3D bioprinted organ would not be subject to NOTA’s purchase/sell prohibition as it is not a “human organ.” To say otherwise would be a legal contradiction and retroactively negate a finding of patentability. Additionally, the
legislative intent behind NOTA makes the argument for creating a specialized
“bioprinted organ” exception a tough argument to swallow.
A 3D bioprinted organ, patented or not, is more analogous to a medical device rather than a natural human organ for regulatory sake.161 Thus, a 3D bioprinted organ should be regulated by the FDA as a medical device, specifically
a Class III device.162 Treating a 3D bioprinted organ as such, NOTA rightfully
would not apply as NOTA stands now. Nor should Congress amend NOTA to
extend the ban of the sale and purchase of organs to patented 3D bioprinted
organs. Doing so would contradict the legislative intent behind NOTA, which,
if you recall, was inspired by three considerations:
(1) the religious belief that one’s soul is inextricably tied to their
body;
(2) the lack of an altruistic system raises concerns about the
quality of the organ supply; and
(3) because the free-market sale of organs will entrench social
inequality by benefiting the wealthy at the expense of the
poor.163
1. Can You Print a Soul?
Beginning with the first factor, the religious belief that one’s soul is inextricably tied to their body is not applicable to a 3D bioprinted organ. A 3D bioprinted
organ is synthesized by a 3D printer controlled by a scientist.164 A 3D bioprinted
organ’s origin is a 3D printer—not a human body.165 An individual is not born

161 See Michael H. Park, For A New Heart, Just Click Print: The Effect on Medical and Products
Liability from 3-D Printed Organs, U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 187, 199 (2015) (“[I]t is likely that
with the combination of the FDA’s oversight of biological tissues for transplantation, medical devices for transplantation, and the similarity between artificial hearts and 3-D printed organs that the FDA will have the duty to regulate the manufacture of 3-D printed organs.”).
162 See id. at 208. (“Since the artificial heart is already regulated as a Class III device, it would
seem 3-D printed organs, hearts, livers, kidneys, etc., would be regulated as Class III devices
[by the FDA].” (citing Product Classification, FDA www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/
cfdocs/cfpcd/classification.cfm?ID=1021 (last updated Mar. 17, 2020) (classifying artificial
heart))).
163 Jacobson, supra note 90 at 1122-23; see also discussion infra Part II.C.
164 See generally Wang, supra note 21.
165 Id.
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with a 3D bioprinted organ.166 Therefore, one’s soul cannot be inextricably167
tied to a 3D bioprinted organ because the individual (and his soul) lived for a
discrete period of time without a 3D bioprinted organ. As such, Congress’ first
consideration does not extend to 3D bioprinted organs.
2. There Cannot Be Altruism Without “You”
Congress’ second consideration, that the lack of an altruistic system raises
concerns about the quality of the organ supply, also does not extend to 3D bioprinted organs. This “altruistic” concern, in the natural human organ context,
was buttressed by the belief that commodification would essentially destroy the
voluntary organ donation system.168 Namely, this belief sprung from the notion
that “[c]ompensation to donors [would] degrade the quality of the organ supply,
by inducing potential donors to lie about their medical histories in order to make
their organs marketable.”169 Altruism can be “defined as acting with the absence
of any personal benefit beyond the satisfaction of giving.”170 In the organ donation context, altruism is typically defined as “an absence of monetary exchange
and commercialization.”171 Altruistic concerns are implicated by an individual’s
autonomy over their own organs — a function of bodily autonomy. Altruistic
concerns are therefore relevant in the discussion of legalization of the sale/purchase of natural human organs. However, such concerns are irrelevant to determining whether 3D bioprinted organs should be commodified.
The primary purpose behind the FDA’s medical device regulatory system is
to ensure the overall quality of medical devices by certifying such devices’ safety
and functionality.172 The quality of the supply of 3D bioprinted organs can therefore be ensured by regulating these organs as medical devices. There is not a lack
Id.
Merriam-Webster defines “inextricable” as “incapable of being disentangled or untied.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inextricable (last visited Apr. 4, 2020, 8:01 PM).
168 See Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852, 860 n. 30 (9th Cir. 2012)( citing National Organ Transplant Act: Hearing on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (“If [people are allowed to sell
their kidneys], I believe our efforts to promote voluntary organ donations would collapse, and
health risks to transplant patients would greatly increase. . . .”).
169 Id.; see also id. n. 30 (citing to Maurice McGregor, Pragmatic Altruism, 160 CAN. MED. ASS’N
J. 5, 91 (1999) (“The need for money is a disincentive to honest disclosure, a disincentive
whose force will increase with the strength of the need.”).
170 Akshara Meran, Organ Donation: Altruism vs. Incentive, AMA J. ETHICS (VIRTUAL MENTOR)
(2002), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/organ-donation-altruism-vs-incentive/
2002-08.
171 Marie-Chantal Fortin et al., The Enigmatic Nature of Altruism in Organ Transplantation: A
Cross-Cultural Study of Transplant Physicians’ Views on Altruism, 3 BMC RES. NOTES 1, 1 (2010),
https://bmcresnotes.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1756-0500-3-216.
172 See Medical Device Overview, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/industry/regulated-products/medical-device-overview (last updated Sep. 14, 2018) (stating that the FDA is responsible
for “evaluat[ing] the safety and effectiveness of . . . medical devices”).
166
167
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of a system that guarantees quality. Granted, some regulations specifically tailored to 3D bioprinted organs may need to be added; however, the building
blocks already exist.173 The FDA already oversees biological tissues174 for transplantation and 3D printed medical devices175 for transplantation.176 A 3D bioprinted organ, a 3D printed medical device for transplantation comprised of
human cells,177 is merely a hybrid of two entities the FDA already regulates.
Moreover, the second consideration is inapplicable to 3D bioprinted organs as
systems (or at least the building blocks of a system) assuring the supply quality
of bioprinted organs currently exist under the FDA.
3. Social Inequality
As for Congress’s third consideration in banning the purchase and sale of
human organs, that the free-market sale of organs will entrench social inequality
by benefitting the wealthy at the expense of the poor, key differences between
3D bioprinted organs and natural human organs render this consideration irrelevant. As such, a free-market sale of 3D bioprinted organs, unlike natural human
organs, will resemble the free-market sale of medical devices. The free-market
sale of bioprinted organs will cause no more inequality as medical devices sold
on the market cause now.178 This proposition draws from the similarities between medical devices already subject to regulation by the FDA, and the differences between 3D bioprinted organs and natural human organs. Like medical
devices and unlike human organs, bioprinted organs are man-made.179 Thus, the
pressures of scarcity inherent to natural human organs are not inherent to 3D
bioprinted organs or medical devices, like pacemakers.180 Absent such scarcity of
3D bioprinted organs, bioprinted organs as free-market goods will most likely

See Park, supra note 161, at 199 (“The FDA’s regulations cover human cells and tissues
that are intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a [patient] . . . .’”
(citing Tissue & Tissue Products, FDA, http:// www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/TissueTissueProducts/default.htm (last updated Jul. 11, 2019))).
174 Id.
175 See Medical Applications of 3D Printing, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/3dprinting-medical-devices/medical-applications-3d-printing (last updated Dec. 4, 2017) (“The
FDA regulates 3D printed medical devices through the same pathways as traditional medical
devices[.]”).
176 See Park, supra note 161, at 198 (“The FDA already regulates medical implants.” (citing
Implants and Prosthetics, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/default.htm (last updated Sep. 30, 2019))).
177 See supra Part II.A (defining what a 3D bioprinted organ is).
178 Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1127 (“[3D bioprinted organ] expenses will probably be unaffordable to the poorer segments of society, in effect, establishing a two-tier organ replacement system: those with money can purchase a bioprinted replacement organ, while those
without must wait on the lengthy organ donation list.”).
179 See id.
180 See id.
173
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not, as Congress envisioned and feared, drive a wedge between social classes in
a way free-market natural human organs would.
An underlying catalyst behind this envisioned inequality is the anticipation
that the majority of organ “sellers” would be low-income individuals.181 Such a
catalyst, however, is absent in a realm where 3D bioprinted organs exist. While
inequality could arise with respect to wealthier individuals being able to better
afford 3D bioprinted organs by similar logic, it would not similarly extend to
incentivizing low-income individuals to physically deprive themselves of a body
part—a situation that Congress imagined in a world where the sale and purchase
of natural human organs was legalized. The concern of physical deprivation is
not present in the transaction of a 3D bioprinted organ. One cannot be deprived
of something he never owned or possessed.182 The narrower scope of inequality
associated with 3D bioprinted organs, relative to natural human organs, is largely
due to a difference in these organs’ origin. When talking about the sale of natural
human organs, the theory is that low-income individuals would generally be directly subjected to inequality in two ways. As touched on earlier, the first mechanism captures donor-related inequality.183 In a free-market of human organs,
poorer people will face a greater incentive to donate their organs and will likely
do so.184 This decision, pressured by financial trouble, bears the risk of not being
a well-informed one.185 Moreover, the inequality surrounding the commodification of 3D bioprinted organs is more akin to, if not coterminous with, that of
medical devices. Thus, 3D bioprinted organs should be regulated as medical devices.
C. THE FATE OF AN INFRINGING BIOPRINTED ORGAN

An individual who has a bioprinted organ subject to a successful patent infringement case will likely not be subject to a Smythe-like “seizure and extraction” for several reasons. First, seizure would certainly be contrary to longstanding public policy as the implant, albeit infringing, is nonetheless vital to that
individual’s health and wellbeing.186 Additionally, as bioprinted organs should
and will most likely be regulated as medical devices,187 seizure of the infringing
See id.
See Deprivation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“An act of taking away.”). In
the event, however, that one gains a property right in a 3D bioprinted organ – if treated as a
medical device regulation-wise – these rights would be established by contract (with the hospital/manufacturer) and hospital regulations. See discussion supra Part II.D; See U-M Hospitals
and Health Centers Policies and Procedures, supra note 129 (example of internal hospital regulations
for implants/explants).
183 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
184 See Jacobson, supra note 90, at 1127.
185 See id.
186 See, e.g., discussion about how pervading values of autonomy and bodily respect have
influenced federal legislation supra Section II.D.1.
187 See discussion supra Section III.B.
181
182
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organ as the sole remedy for a patent infringement case would be counter to
longstanding judicial practice.188 Seizure would not serve a remedial purpose and
would unduly burden the individual with the implant, rather than burden the
primary infringer (the seller or manufacturer of the device). Judicial remedies,
either compensatory or equitable, aim to make injured plaintiffs “whole again”
or incentivize conformity with current law and disincentivize future aberrant behavior.189 Seizing an individual’s implant neither makes the patent owner “whole
again” nor disincentivizes future infringement because the threat of seizure
would be on the implant recipient, not the primary infringer. Thus, a remedy of
“seizure and extraction” would be practically meaningless; it would merely be a
remedy solely by name, not by function. Second, the seizure of infringing bioprinted organs would most likely be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment as an unreasonable search and seizure, and under the Fifth Amendment as
a prohibited taking of private property.190 Moreover given the myriad of policy
and constitutional concerns, it is unlikely that individuals with infringing medical
implants will end up like Smythe (at least not lawfully).191
IV.

CONCLUSION

3D bioprinted organs will, more likely than not, be patent-eligible subject
matter. It follows that a bioprinted organ, patented or not, should be regulated
by the FDA as a medical device and should not be subject to NOTA’s commodification ban on human organs. As NOTA stands now, 3D bioprinted organs do
not fall within NOTA’s regulatory framework. Neither should NOTA be
amended to expressly cover 3D bioprinted organs as to preserve initial legislative
intent.
With particular respect to patented 3D bioprinted organs, regulation of a patented 3D bioprinted organ as a “human organ” under NOTA would contradict
a finding that a 3D bioprinted organ is patentable subject matter. Subjecting bioprinted organs to NOTA’s anti-commodification provision would directly conflict with the patented organ’s circumvention of § 101’s law of nature exception.
Thus, for the sake of remaining faithful to § 101’s text and underlying intent,
patented bioprinted organs should not be regulated as human organs.
As a final thought, the growing reality of bioprinted organs reflects the immense rate at which technology is growing and the astounding breadth of
See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 751 (E.D.N.Y.
1995), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (rewarding $26,348,984 in lost profit damages to
patentee’s hip implant prosthesis).
189 See Ted Sichelman, supra note 137 (explaining traditional remedies rewarded in patent
infringement suits).
190 U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V.
191 As an additional consideration, family members who elect to sell a decedent’s infringing
implant would be protected from liability by the exhaustion doctrine. See discussion of the
exhaustion doctrine supra Section II.E.2.
188
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scientific innovation. We, the public, need to begin considering the brink on
which we stand and ponder what possibly lies on the other side. A Repo Men-like
world is grim, but knowledge serves as a vital component to preventing such an
outcome. For the time being, it is unlikely that any of us will end up like Smythe.
Remember though, “artiforgs” seemed like a distant reality in 2010 and now they
are undergoing medical trials for implantation. Smythe’s fate may similarly creep
up on us if we turn a blind eye.
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